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the task of putting together a plausi-
ble account of how some aspect of the 
universe works is akin to assembling 
a jigsaw puzzle where the shape of the 
pieces may change depending on one’s 
viewpoint. and there is no picture on 
the box to serve as a guide.
all kinds of scientific enterprise and 
concentrated inquiry pose these sorts of 
challenges, but investigations into the 
nature of the mind bring an additional 
challenge – the job at hand is not just 
to parse reality and develop a coher-
ent story, but in effect to “parse the 
parser” and develop a coherent story of 
its workings. How does one parse the 
mind? Do we categorize its function-
ing as mental or physical? is it one big 
homogenous lump or a heterogeneous 
set of distinct abilities or mental facul-
ties? Do we envision its workings to be 
like some kind of hydraulic mechanism, 
a steam engine, or more like some kind 
of information processor, such as a 
computer? a large variety of possibili-
ties have been offered over the centu-
ries. Current models of the mind see it 
functioning like an information proces-
sor with numerous distinct modules 
carrying out individual tasks. Faculties 
such as thinking, feeling and willing  
are usually understood to be separate 
processes, and though a certain degree 
of materialism is assumed in many 
debates about mental architecture, the 
consensus is far from clear on the onto-
logical status of the mind.
a number of years ago i started look-
ing at how one aspect of minds—
consciousness—might operate. By 
consciousness, i mean subjective 
experience, the ongoing sense of what 
it is like to be you. after some time of 
being excited by the next new book 
promising to explain consciousness, 
it became evident that scholars were 
in a serious muddle about conscious-
ness, including even how to define the 
term. at this point, rather than slogging 
through more books on consciousness, 
i found myself examining the history 
of psychology. the task was to see if 
the roots of various current conceptual 
difficulties could be found by looking 
at the evolution of thinking about the 
mind, and if not, to see if something 
useful for the debate could be found. 
interestingly, a number of ideas present-
ed themselves from one of the places 
where it all began for western culture, 
the ancient Homeric epics, the Iliad and 
the Odyssey. Below i provide a glimpse 
of what Homeric minds were like and 
present some ideas that might be useful 
for current psychological debate.
Homeric Psychology 101
in Homer, the most significant terms 
for psychological functioning are noos, 
thumos, and phre¯n or its plural phrenes. a 
fourth term, psyche¯, does not represent 
much psychological functioning in 
Homer (a bit ironic for the root term 
psychology), but the term essentially 
referred to the non-cognitive shade that 
survived after death. entire papers and 
monographs have been written on each 
of these terms, but a quick synopsis of 
the first three will suffice here.
Noos is associated with insight or intui-
tion, a clear apprehension of some state 
of affairs. it is also associated with men-
tal vision, a kind of mental imagery and 
imagination, with a way of thinking 
that may be the essential psychological 
character of a person or group, and with 
a person’s mental essence. at one point 
in the Odyssey, Circe turns Odysseus’ 
crewmates into swine; however, even 
though they are now rather different 
creatures than they were, they each 
retain their noos. By this, they remain, 
in a personal psychological sense, 
Odysseus’ human crewmates.
Phre¯n and its plural phrenes are associated 
with cognition and reasoning, a way 
of figuring things out if noos was not 
able to immediately grasp a situation. 
Phrenes also serves as a physical place for 
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cognition, around the lungs, and they 
serve an important role in language. 
when people are deliberating on what 
they will say next, they often place this 
deliberation in phrenes for consideration.
Thumos also has cognitive aspects, but it 
is a more willful and sometimes violent 
f lavor of cognition that is also laced 
with emotion. it is often the source 
of forceful, energetic, emotional and 
willful cognition that leads to action. 
it is also associated with life itself; as 
when people are deprived of their 
thumos, they also die. Finally, thumos is 
associated with inner dialogue. Such 
dialogue often involves some type of 
internal conf lict that must be resolved, 
such as: should i strive for honor even 
though the cost might be great? For 
example, when Odysseus is confronted 
with an unsettling mass of trojan war-
riors bearing down on him, his thumos 
debates the merits between retreat, 
which would carry the associated 
assumption of cowardice, or staying to 
fight the trojans despite his tactical  
disadvantages. He then goes on to 
deliberate this decision in phrenes and 
thumos as the trojan masses approach.
aside from such basic psychological ter-
minology, there are a number of other 
details to consider in order to get a bet-
ter sense of these constructs and their 
workings. First, there is no Homeric 
term that corresponds to what we mean 
by “mind.” Mind, of course, has its 
own range of meanings even today, 
but the term is used here simply to 
refer to that concept, place, or domain 
that encapsulates our psychological 
structures and processes. the Homeric 
mental constructs are not encapsulated 
in a single coherent construct, such as 
a mind or even a soul, and they are not 
in the head. rather, they are scattered 
in the area around the lungs, heart and 
diaphragm, areas of the body that could 
be referred to as the splanchna, a term 
generally meaning “innards” around 
the chest and upper abdominal area. 
thus, there were many “minds” rum-
bling around in the torso.
Second, the ontological status of these 
many minds is unclear at best, and 
maybe even incommensurable with 
current sensibilities. Some researchers 
have variously referred to these things 
as mental organs, an odd juxtaposition  
to be sure, but one that ref lects the 
idea that they may have literally been 
conceptualized in some sense as a 
combination or blending of the mental 
and the physical. to current sensibili-
ties, this may sound odd, though one 
must remember that the dualism of a 
world made of either mental or material 
things did not yet exist. 
third, as can be seen above, each term 
has a variety of psychological functions 
or associations. this situation, however, 
should be viewed carefully, as separat-
ing the term into different semantic 
categories is a current-day partitioning 
of its originally more unified semantic 
field. For example, noos may very well 
have meant, in a fashion that is difficult 
for current sensibilities to fully appreci-
ate, all of those meanings at once. 
Finally, there are many overlappings 
and functional or categorical blur-
rings both between and within the 
constructs. in one aspect, each psy-
chological term may have a more or 
less predominant set of meanings, but 
the semantic and functional overlap 
between the terms can be very high, 
and in some cases the terms seem 
almost synonymous. in another, certain 
psychological processes that are cur-
rently viewed as separate were fused, 
such as emotion and cognition, or even 
those two plus volition and action. 
thus, you did not just think about 
something, rather you thought-felt-willed 
something. again, this is a rather odd 
juxtaposition given our current sensi-
bilities. But, perhaps just as oddly, the 
system seemed to work, as least as far as 
epic poetry went.
Two Possible Thinking 
Points for Current Debates
what does one make of all this? First, 
it provides a fascinating glimpse into 
a long-gone world’s ethnopsychol-
ogy. But, does it inform any current 
debates about mental architecture and 
the workings of the mind? a number of 
possibilities present themselves, and two 
of these are brief ly presented below.
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For one, there is no mind-body prob-
lem in Homer. the mind-body prob-
lem is a distinct hang-up for explaining 
consciousness; how could it be that the 
physical brain could possibly create 
what seems to be a loftier kind of thing, 
namely subjective experience and men-
tal states? Figuring out exactly how a 
non-physical thing could interact with 
a physical thing, and vice versa, has 
been attempted throughout history by 
various thinkers, including Descartes 
(who failed), but it is also not just 
something of the past. Some researchers 
have recently proposed that quantum 
interactions at special points in neu-
rons somehow give birth to mental 
states from the physical brain. Perhaps 
the mind-body problem is based on 
assumptions that need some rework-
ing, and the idea that something can be 
both physical and non-physical, perhaps 
pseudo-physical, provides an interesting 
thinking point for such debate.
For another, the idea that a certain 
mental construct may have a number 
of different functions, overlap some 
functions with other mental constructs, 
and also combine seemingly disparate 
processes such as thinking, feeling, and 
willing into an odd-sounding combi-
nation or gestalt is very interesting. the 
importance here lies in our current 
parsings of the mind into distinct facul-
ties, and in some research even into 
orthogonal, non-overlapping mental 
modules, each with a specific task, each 
tightly encapsulated in its own small 
domain. the computational theory 
of mind, a leading paradigm in men-
tal functioning, is particularly known 
for the use of some degree of modular 
mental functioning based upon the 
f low of information through various 
modules and processors. Depending 
upon how much of the mind is thought 
to be modular, this is a very tidy 
arrangement, but nature is under no 
requirement to be tidy. Stephen Pinker 
published a book titled How the Mind 
Works (1997) that presents a computa-
tional model of the mind that employs a 
large degree of mental modularity, even 
for higher-level psychological func-
tions. the philosopher of mind Jerry 
Fodor was one of the earlier proponents 
of the modular mind, though mostly for 
lower-level computational processes. 
in response to Pinker’s book, Fodor 
wrote The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way 
(2000), in which he explained why the 
computational model of the mind with 
such massive modularity is insufficient. 
He even gets a bit gloomy at times, 
such as when he states that “…what our 
cognitive science has found out about 
the mind is mostly that we don’t know 
how it works.” (p.100). 
all this makes one wonder whether 
or not the ability of our own minds to 
parse the universe and analyze prob-
lems into their little bits may need 
some reining in. that is, what is logi-
cally separable may not be separable in 
fact. thinking about distinct mental 
faculties or mental modules is a bit too 
sloppy. For example, there is no a priori 
reason that thinking and feeling must 
actually be different things, or at least 
completely unblended in some way. as 
well, there is also no a priori reason why 
certain functions of the mind must not 
overlap with other functions, produc-
ing a bit of mental redundancy and 
blending, and thereby, perhaps a more 
f lavorful mental experience. 
In Conclusion
aside from presenting a fascinating 
window into the mental workings of 
Homeric figures, the lack of a mind-
body problem as well as the functional 
“sloppiness” of Homer’s mental organs 
present some interesting thinking 
points for current psychology. while 
these insights may not be a panacea that 
will miraculously resolve serious issues 
in current psychology, they do open up 
some interesting possibilities to think 
outside the current box, as it were, by 
looking into a much more ancient box 
to inform our current debate. 
additionally, an interesting methodo-
logical issue arises when pondering such 
things. it makes one wonder a bit about 
the mind’s ability to decipher itself. 
Minds need to be excellent parsers, 
categorizers, and story tellers in order 
to get us by in whatever reality we find 
ourselves. However, is it possible that 
the mind might be a bit parse-happy in 
parsing itself? it is always a bit of a trick 
to try to measure something with itself. 
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